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Prescribing laws to nature. Part I.
Newton, the pre-Critical Kant, and three
problems about the lawfulness of nature
Abstract: This paper traces the early reflections of the pre-Critical Kant on laws of
nature back to Newton’s governing conception of laws. Three problems with the
Newtonian conception are identified. I argue that in the attempt to provide a sol-
ution to them, in 1763 Kant came to forge a novel governing conception of laws.
Key to Kant’s novel view are the notions of ground and its determinations. The
role of these two notions in delivering the nomological necessity, explanatory
power, and unity of the laws of nature is discussed and analysed.
Keywords: laws of nature, governing conception of laws, Newton, pre-Critical
Kant
Michela Massimi: The University of Edinburgh; michela.massimi@ed.ac.uk
1 Introduction
What makes nature a lawful system? Kant’s view about the lawfulness of nature
is famously captured by some passages of the Prolegomena (Prol, AA 04: 320) and
the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (KrV, B 165), where Kant suggests
that the lawfulness of nature is the product of our faculties, primarily, the faculty
of the understanding prescribing laws to nature. How did Kant arrive at this view?
Did Kant subscribe to a governing conception of laws? And how should such a
governing conception of laws be characterized?
In this paper, I tackle these central questions by elucidating three main
points. First, I clarify what is at stake in a governing conception of laws. Second,
I get clear about the historical background against which Kant came to elaborate
his pre-Critical governing conception of laws, back to Isaac Newton. Third, I focus
on how the pre-Critical Kant articulated his view about the lawfulness of nature in
The Only Possible Argument in Support of the Demonstration of the Existence of God
(1763), which is one of the earliest texts where Kant put forward seminal ideas
about the lawfulness of nature. In Section 2, I briefly review Newton’s take on the
lawfulness of nature and I identify three problems left open by Newton’s view. In
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Section 3, I argue that Kant’s view in The Only Possible Argument provides solutions
to these three problems, which ultimately commit the young Kant to a governing
conception of laws of dispositional essentialist flavor.
So what is the governing conception of laws? In contemporary terms, the gov-
erning conception takes its cue from the anti-Humean intuition that there is some-
thing special about laws of nature – they are not just descriptions of occurrent
states of affairs. Key to the governing conception is the intuition that laws have a
prescriptive role, or a distinctive nomological force. Laws prescribe or govern the
way nature ought to be. The analogy is with jurisprudence, where laws are pre-
scriptive and codify acceptable norms of social behavior, rather than being mere
descriptions of factual matters about social arrangements. In jurisprudence, the
prescriptive force of the laws emanates from some recognized authority that exer-
cises its ruling power, and breaking the laws involves sanctions and punishment.
But how do laws govern nature? There seem to be three key ideas involved in
the governing conception of laws. First, if laws govern, there must be a lawgiver,
who imposes them. Although Humeans may righty retort that it is not a concep-
tual truth that laws presuppose a lawgiver,1 it is certainly such under the govern-
ing conception of laws; and for good historical reasons too, as we will see shortly.
Second, laws seem to govern by prescribing, rather than describing, the way na-
ture ought to behave. Finally, laws prescribe by necessitating states of affairs in
nature. This third aspect is paramount to any governing conception of laws. What
is distinctive of laws, under the governing account, is their ability to necessitate
the way things ought to be. The necessity distinctive of laws takes the name of
nomological necessity, and is usually regarded as accomplishing two distinct jobs.
Nomological necessity is primarily meant to track some physical necessity in
nature. Laws of nature govern by capturing physical necessities in nature. For
example, one may say that Coulomb’s law governs electrostatic phenomena
by capturing a physically necessary behavior of static electric charges. How to
understand the relation between the governing role of laws and the physically
necessary states of affairs varies from one strand to another of the view. For
example, the standard Necessitarian view associated in contemporary philos-
ophy of science with the names of Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley sees physical
necessity in nature as a top-down instantiation of laws of nature understood as
necessitation relations between universals properties. It is physically necessary
that Fa is Ga is an instantiation of the law that says that the universal property
1 See Beebee, Helen: “The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature”. In: Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 61, 2000, 571–594.
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F-ness necessitates, or brings along with it, the universal property G-ness.2 Under
the dispositional essentialist account, on the other hand, physical necessity
comes first and is grounded in nature’s capacities and natural powers, from which
laws of nature are read off. Thus, a dispositional essentialist would regard the no-
mological necessity of Coulomb’s law as grounded on the physical necessity with
which, say, a point-like electric charge has the power to attract (or repel) another
point-like electric charge of opposite (or equal) charge.3 Either way, top-down or
bottom-up, under the governing conception of laws nomological necessity traces
physical necessity in nature.
Nomological necessity does also a second job: it would typically explain the
occurrence of events. Laws explain why the next observed Fa is going to be Ga in
virtue of the necessary connection holding between F and G. By forsaking physi-
cal necessity, Humeans seem to be saddled with the problem of explaining why
the next observed point-like electric charge is likely to attract an electric charge of
opposite sign.4 By tracking physical necessity in nature, a governing conception
of laws can easily explain why the collection of past observed occurrences of Fa,
which are Ga, provide also reasons for explaining (and predicting) that the next
Fb we will observe is bound to be Gb (pace Hume’s problem of induction).
Contemporary discussions about the governing conception of laws show at
best the far-reaching legacy of the topic Kant engaged with. But they do not begin
to show that Kant shared the conceptual tools of the contemporary governing
conception of laws, of course. Was there any governing conception of laws at
Kant’s time? What were its distinctive features? In what follows, I argue that the
young, pre-Critical Kant grappled with a specific governing conception of laws,
offered by Newton, and with some of its philosophical problems. In 1763 Kant
gave his own solution to these problems. Kant’s solution borrows a key metaphys-
ical notion (such as the notion of ground) from Wolff to provide ultimately a bot-
tom-up account of the necessity of the laws as grounded in nature’s forces and
their determinations. While the key metaphysical notion is borrowed from Wolf-
fian metaphysics, Newton’s natural philosophy provided once more the template
for Kant’s view.
2 See Armstrong, David: What is a law of nature? Cambridge 1983.
3 See Bird, Alexander: Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and Properties. Oxford 2007, and Ellis, Brian:
Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge 2001.
4 As a clarificatory remark, this is not to say that one can explain the occurrence of an event by
citing nomically necessary laws. Humeans would disagree, and this is in fact a contested issue.
But what nomological necessity does, is to explain why the next F will be G, by securing the
physically necessary link between F and G. In the absence of that link, Necessitarians are right in
noting that Hume’s problem of induction looms on the horizon.
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2 Newton’s governing conception of laws
That laws presuppose a lawgiver may well not be a conceptual truth; but it is,
undoubtedly, a historical truth. The governing conception of laws emerged with
the scientific revolution, and the philosophical reflections that accompanied it.
And a quick look at two key figures in this trend, Descartes and Newton, soon
reveals that like its contemporary version, the early modern version too shares
the three aforementioned points about a lawgiver, prescribing, and necessitating,
with suitable provisos. The main proviso is that by contrast with the contempor-
ary version, there is no doubt that the early modern governing conception of laws
had theistic origins in the idea of God as a lawgiver imposing an order on nature.
Take Descartes, who in the Principles of Philosophy declared that God created
matter with motion and rest and “since He moved in several different ways the
particles of matter when He created them, and since He maintains all of them in
the same way and with the same laws that He made them observe through their cre-
ation, He incessantly conserves an equal quantity of movement in matter”.5 Even
more poignantly: “Please do not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that
it is God who has laid down these laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in
his kingdom”.6 Or, consider Cotes’ Preface to Newton’s Principia:
this world – so beautifully diversified in its forms and motions – could not have arisen
except from the perfectly free will of God, who provides and governs all things. From this
source, then, have all the laws that are called laws of nature come, in which many traces of
the highest wisdom and counsel certainly appear, but no traces of necessity. Accordingly we
should not seek these laws by using untrustworthy conjectures, but learn them by observing
and experimenting. He who is confident that he can truly find the principles of physics and
the laws of things, by relying only on the force alone of his mind, and the internal light of
his reason should maintain either that the world has existed from necessity, and follows
the said laws from the same necessity; or that although the order of nature was constituted
by the will of God, nevertheless a creature as small and as insignificant as he is has a clear
understanding of the way things should be.7
5 Descartes, René: Principles of Philosophy. Tr. by Blair Reynolds. New York 1988, Section 36,
6. Emphasis added.
6 Descartes, René: The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. 3 vols. Ed. by John Cottingham and
Anthony Kenny. Cambridge. 1984–1989. Vol. III, 23.
7 “Cotes’ Preface to the Second Edition of Newton’s Principia.” In: Newton, Isaac: The Principia.
Tr. by Bernard Cohen, Anne Whitman and Julia Budenz. California 1999, 397f.
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Cotes suggests here that the necessity of the laws cannot follow from the necessity
of the world itself, nor be accessed by the force alone of one’s own mind. Instead,
laws follow from the order of nature established by God himself, as the perfect
Lawgiver acting with wisdom and providence towards His creation.
No wonder Newton in the Principia used the verb “to govern” in relation to
God and the laws of nature: God governs and knows all things that are or can be
done and the motions of the comets are said to be governed by the same laws that
govern the motion of the planets. Newton believed also that laws of motion could
be inferred (or deduced) from phenomena, by observation and experiments. In no
way did Newton regard our knowledge of the laws of nature as itself dependent
upon metaphysical or theistic assumptions. However, Newton did regard the pre-
scribing force of the laws of nature as originating itself from theistic assumptions.
Newton was, in fact, critical of the Cartesian idea that sheer mechanical causes
could originate motions; as he was sceptical of the idea that laws of nature per
se could explain what set planets and comets in motion. Instead, for Newton, the
source of the lawfulness of nature had to be found is the Biblical Lord God Pan-
tokrator. Nature, with all its mathematically demonstrable forces and laws, is
ultimately the dominion of God. In the General Scholium, Newton writes: “[All
bodies] will indeed persevere in their orbits by the laws of gravity, but they cer-
tainly could not originally have acquired the regular positions of the orbits by
these laws. […] This most elegant system of the sun, planets and comets could
not have arisen without the design and dominion of an intelligent and powerful
being. […] He rules all things, not as the world soul but as the lord of all. And be-
cause of his dominion he is called Lord God Pantokrator”.8
Laws of nature originate from the deliberations and free choice of a Univer-
sal Ruler. Newton laid the foundations for a governing conception of laws, which
proved influential in the centuries to come. The necessity of the laws (e.g., the
necessity through which Newton’s laws prescribe orbital motions) ultimately
derives from, and depends upon God. Laws prescribe nature only to the extent
that God has freely established them to rule His dominion. Yet Newton’s account
left open three important questions, which, not surprisingly, became the battle-
ground for philosophical disputes in the following decades:
(1) The problem of nomological necessity. Laws of nature enjoy a special status
because they originate directly from God’s free choice and deliberations.
But if their nomological necessity is, so to speak, derivative from God’s free
8 Newton, Isaac: Principia, General Scholium, 940.
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choice and deliberation, how could laws by themselves (i.e. without resorting
to God himself) genuinely prescribe the way nature ought to be?9
(2) The problem of explicability. The universality and immutability of the laws,
under Newton’s account, seems to capture universal and immutable relational
properties (or proportions) among material objects. The law of gravity, for
example, captures how the force of gravity is inversely proportional to the
square of the distance between any two material bodies. This inverse pro-
portion between the force F and the squared-distance r2 is invariable. But the
Newtonian account does not tell us much about what one might call the intrin-
sic, monadic properties that presumably ground such relational properties, or
immutable proportions in nature. No wonder, Leibniz retorted that the oper-
ations of the force of gravity were miraculous, absurd, or simply obscure.10
9 Another way of expressing this point is that the necessity that cascades down from the Lord
God Pantokrator to nature via laws seems to be missing the metaphysical step between the
necessity of the laws (coming from God’s choice, directly), and the supposedly necessary connec-
tions in nature (e.g., between forces and motions), which laws are meant to capture. Laws seem
to be lacking a genuine prescriptive force in and of themselves, in Newton’s system. Newton was
left with no other choice than making his God Pantokrator the Work-Day God, rather than the
God of the Sabbath, to use Koyré’s apt expression, with all the paradoxical consequences that
Leibniz’s second paper against Clarke clearly highlighted: “I do not say the material world is a
machine, or watch, that goes without God’s interposition […]. But I maintain it to be a watch, that
goes without wanting to be mended by him: otherwise we must say that God bethinks himself
again […]. 12. To conclude. If God is obliged to mend the course of nature from time to time, it must
be done either supernaturally or naturally. If it be done supernaturally, we must have recourse to
miracles, in order to explain natural things: which is reducing an hypothesis ad absurdum […].
But if it be done naturally, then God will not be intelligentia supramundana […] that is, he will be
the soul of the world”. In: The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. Ed. by H. G. Alexander. Manchester
1956, 18 and 20.
10 “112. In good philosophy, and sound theology, we ought to distinguish between what is ex-
plicable by the natures and powers of creatures, and what is explicable only by the powers of the
infinite substance. We ought to make an infinite difference between the operation of God, which
goes beyond the extent of natural powers; and the operations of things that follow the law which
God has given them, and which he has enabled them to follow by their natural powers, though not
without his assistance. 113 This overthrows attractions, properly so called, and other operations
inexplicable by the natural powers of creatures; which kinds of operations, the assertors of them
must suppose to be effected by miracles, or else have recourse to absurdities, that is, to the occult
qualities of the schools”. Leibniz’s fifth paper, in The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, 92, em-
phases added. For a recent discussion of the explanatory role of the laws in Newton, see Jansson,
Lina: “Newton’s ‘satis est’: a new explanatory role for laws”. In: Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science 44, 2013, 553–562.
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(3) The problem of unity. Newton famously refused to enter metaphysical discus-
sions about the cause of gravity, and repeatedly denied that gravity was an
essential or inherent11 property of matter (by contrast with inertia). In so
doing, he provided only a mathematical, not a metaphysical account of grav-
ity. To the eyes of many contemporaries of Newton, a metaphysical account
was needed to provide unity to what would otherwise be a contingent aggre-
gate of phenomena subject to gravity (from ocean’s tides, to the free fall, and
planetary motion).
In the next Section, I argue that the young Kant grappled with these pressing
questions about laws of nature and their governing role, left open by Newton and
ensuing debates with Leibniz. In 1763 the young Kant gave some provisional sol-
utions to these three problems, by trying to reconcile the role of God as the su-
preme Lawgiver and the ultimate source of the order of nature (along Newton’s
lines), with the metaphysical (Wolffian) idea of necessary connections in nature
explicated in terms of grounds and their determinations.
3 The pre-Critical Kant in 1763: early reflections
on laws of nature, and their governing role
The only possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God,
is one of the very first texts where Kant offered a philosophical analysis of laws
of nature, their governing role, and necessity. By that time, Kant had already
abundantly engaged with Newton’s natural philosophy both in Universal Natu-
ral History (1755) and Physical Monadology (1756), alongside other short essays in
natural science of this period, such as On Fire, a couple of texts on the rotation of
11 See Newton, Isaac, op. cit., Rule 3, 796 “Yet I am by no means affirming that gravity is essen-
tial to bodies. By inherent force I mean only the force of inertia. This is immutable. Gravity is dim-
inished as bodies recede from the earth”. This point is even more forcefully expressed in New-
ton’s correspondence with Bentley: “You [Bentley] sometimes speak of Gravity as essential and
inherent to Matter. Pray do not ascribe that Notion to me”. In: Newton, Isaac: Correspondence.
Ed. by H. W. Turnbull, A. Rupert Hall and L. Tilling. Cambridge 1959–1977, vol. III, 240. For recent
discussion on gravity as an active yet inessential power of matter superadded by God, please see
Henry, John: “Gravity and De Gravitatione: the development of Newton’s ideas on action at a dis-
tance”. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42, 2011, 11–27. For a discussion of how
Newton rejected gravity as an essential inherent property of matter to avoid the charge of Epicur-
eanism, see Ducheyne, Steffen: “Newton on action at a distance and the cause of gravity”. In:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42, 2011, 154–159.
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the Earth and the age of the Earth (1754), three short notes on earthquakes (1756),
a theory of the winds (1756), and most famously New doctrine of motion and rest
(1758). While familiar with Newton’s natural philosophy and its fundamental
principles of repulsion and attraction, before 1763 Kant had not engaged directly
with the Newtonian governing conception of laws. In the 1763 essay, Third Reflec-
tion, Kant tackled the issue of how things in the world depend on God via the
order of nature that He has established:
Something is subsumed under the order of nature if its existence or its alteration is suffi-
ciently grounded in the forces of nature. The first requirement for this is that the force of na-
ture should be the efficient cause of the thing; the second requirement is that the manner
in which the force of nature is directed to the production of this effect should itself be suffi-
ciently grounded in a rule of the natural laws of causality. Such events are also called, quite
simply, natural events of the world.12
Thus, natural events are those whose efficient causes are forces of nature, which
in turn produce their effects according to the “natural laws of causality”. Kant
phrases the whole passage in terms of events being “sufficiently grounded” in
forces, and the force-effect relation itself being “sufficiently grounded” in the
laws of causality. This terminology is carefully chosen, and betrays a subtle point
that is key to my analysis. Kant introduces forces of nature and the laws of causal-
ity to distinguish natural events from supernatural ones, whereby either their
cause is not grounded in forces of nature, or the force-effect relation is not
grounded in a rule of nature itself. This distinction between natural and super-
natural events is functional to show how events such as earthquakes, hurricanes,
tempests, which had occasionally been invoked as God’s punishment on the vi-
cious deeds of a particular town or population, should in fact be regarded as mis-
fortune, Kant claims, because “man’s conduct cannot be a cause of earthquakes
according to a natural law, for there is no connection here between the cause and
the effect”.13 However, Kant soon rectifies
12 “Es steht etwas unter der Ordnung der Natur, in so fern sein Dasein oder seine Veränderung in
den Kräften der Natur zureichend gegründet ist. Hiezu wird erfordert erstlich, daß die Kraft der
Natur davon die wirkende Ursache sei; zweitens, daß die Art, wie sie auf die Hervorbringung
dieser Wirkung gerichtet ist, selbst in einer Regel der natürlichen Wirkungsgesetze hinreichend
gegründet sei. Dergleichen Begebenheiten heißen auch schlechthin natürliche Weltbegebenhei-
ten.” BDG, AA 02: 103.
13 “[…] das […] Verhalten der Menschen kein Grund der Erdbeben nach einem natürlichen Ge-
setze sein kann, weil hier keine Verknüpfung von Ursachen und Wirkungen statt finde.” BDG,
AA 02: 104.
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if the earthquake is to be regarded as a punishment, then it follows that, since these forces
of nature cannot, according to any natural law, have any connection with the conduct of
man, they must in each individual case be especially instituted by the Supreme Being. And
then the event is supernatural in the formal sense of the word, even though the intermediate
cause of the event was a force of nature. (ibid.)14
Starting with the Newtonian template of God as the supreme Lawgiver (while
also obviously engaging with Leibnizian theodicy), Kant teases out three distinct
notions in this passage:
i. the order of nature includes natural events only;
ii. natural events are events grounded in forces of nature qua causes and obey
the natural laws of causality in the force-effect production;
iii. God could ad hoc institute forces of nature to produce devastating effects
such as earthquakes as a punishment for humankind’s moral conducts, but
this would be a supernatural event (via natural causes), because it would
violate universal natural laws.
I am not going to press here Kant’s point against Leibniz’s theodicy, because my
goal is to understand how Kant envisaged instead the order of nature according to
the natural law of causality. Despite God having created the whole arrangement
of natural events in the world, and despite Him being able to intervene super-
naturally in the world as needed, the order of nature seems to enjoy a certain de-
14 “Soll es dagegen als eine Strafe betrachtet werden, so müssen diese Kräfte der Natur, da sie
nach einem natürlichen Gesetze den Zusammenhang mit der Führung der Menschen nicht
haben können, auf jeden solchen einzelnen Fall durch das höchste Wesen besonders gerichtet
sein; alsdann aber ist die Begebenheit im formalen Verstande übernatürlich, obgleich die Mittel-
ursache eine Kraft der Natur war.” BDG, AA 02: 104f. It is worth noting here Kant’s distance from
Leibniz: “89. It can also be said that God as architect satisfies in every way God as legislator, and
that sins must therefore carry their punishment with them by the order of nature, and by virtue of
the mechanical structure of things itself […].” Monadology. Ed. by Lloyd Strickland. Oxford.
Forthcoming. Emphases added). For Leibniz, earthquakes and any other similar natural events
function as punishment for human sins according to an order of nature, not because human sins
may act as efficient causes for these natural events, but rather because of the pre-established har-
mony between the order of nature and the order of grace. Or better, between the “physical king-
dom of nature”, where God is the “architect of the machine of the universe”, and the “moral king-
dom of grace”, where God is the “monarch of the divine city of minds” (Monadology 87.). But
Kant, who as early as in New Elucidation had criticized Leibniz’s pre-established harmony, could
not avail himself of Leibniz’s explanation here. Earthquakes, tempests, when acting as punish-
ment for humankind’s sins, are supernatural according to Kant, in that they do not follow the
order of nature (either in the material or in the formal sense).
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gree of metaphysical autonomy. Laws of nature, especially the “natural laws of
causality”, govern nature by fixing the ways in which forces and their effects, qua
grounds and determinations, are related. Any intervention on behalf of God on
this order of natural events, whilst possible, would be supernatural, subject to the
“immediate divine law, that of the wisdom of God”, but in violation of any natural
law. Nature with its lawful unity is not downstream of the supreme Lawgiver, as it
becomes even more clear in Kant’s discussion of the necessity that accrues to the
order of nature:
All natural things are contingent in their existence. […] But although the laws of nature, like
the things themselves of which they are the laws, accordingly appear to have no necessity,
and although, again, the connections in which these laws can be exercised are contingent,
there nonetheless remains a kind of necessity which is very remarkable. There are, namely,
many laws of nature, of which the unity is necessary.15
What is this necessity that accrues to laws of nature taken as a whole? How can
necessity be bestowed on contingent natural events, whose lawful connections
are themselves said to be contingent? In my view, Kant’s answer to this ques-
tion relies on the key concept of ground. As Eric Watkins has extensively docu-
mented,16 Kant’s discussion about grounds and determinations began in Nova
dilucidatio (1755), where in the context of his discussion of the two new principles
of co-existence and succession, Kant identified the essence of a thing with its
necessary ground, and grappled with the difficult question of explaining how es-
sential, and hence immutable grounds can possibly explain how a substance may
change over time. Kant was latching onto the well-established tradition of Wolff
and Baumgarten about logical grounds as necessary grounds responsible for the
possible essential determinations of things. Kant introduced a distinction be-
tween logical ground, and real ground, which became key to understanding the
necessary connections between substances. In what follows, I take Watkins’s
analysis of the pre-Critical Kant on real grounds on board. I elucidate how in The
only possible argument Kant could give his own solution to the problem of nomo-
logical necessity, once the direct link with the Newtonian Lord God Pankrator had
been severed.
15 “Alle Dinge der Natur sind zufällig in ihrem Dasein. Allein obgleich die Naturgesetze in so
fern keine Nothwendigkeit zu haben scheinen, als die Dinge selbst, davon sie es sind, imgleichen
die Verknüpfungen, darin sie ausgeübt werden können, zufällig sind, so bleibt gleichwohl eine
Art der Nothwendigkeit übrig, die sehr merkwürdig ist. Es giebt nämlich viele Naturgesetze, de-
ren Einheit nothwendig ist […].” BDG, AA 02: 106.
16 E. Watkins (2005) Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality, Cambridge University Press, ch. 2.
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How can the notion of real ground help us answer the above questions about
the necessary unity of the laws? Kant gives the example of “the self-same elastic-
ity and pressure of the air” [dieselbe elastische Kraft und Schwere der Luft] as the
ground of “the laws of respiration” [Gesetz[.] des Athemholens] but also
of necessity the ground of the possibility of pumps, of the generation of clouds, of the main-
tenance of fire, of the winds, and so on. It is necessary that, as soon as the ground of even
merely one of them be present, the ground of the others should also be present.17
In other words, as soon as we posit the elasticity (or repulsive force) of the air as a
real ground, necessarily the generation of the clouds, the maintenance of fire, of
the winds, so forth obtain as effects.
These examples are not surprising. As early as in True estimation, Kant had
identified elasticity or elastic force as the “true machine of nature” [wahre Maschine
der Natur],18 which can be released and triggered by elastic impact of bodies, fol-
lowing a view which he thereby attributed to the Cartesian Jean-Jacques Dortus
De Mairan in his polemic exchange with Emile Du Châtelet about vis viva.19 In Uni-
versal Natural History, Kant took the key step of associating elasticity with New-
ton’s repulsive force, whereby elasticity or better “elastic air” [elastische[.] Luft]
was presented as “capable of maintaining the most violent degrees of fire” [ver-
mögend […] die heftigsten Grade des Feuers […] zu unterhalten]20 in the atmos-
phere of the Sun; and in his 1756 Theory of the Winds the cause of the winds was
itself identified in the “decrease of the expansive force by cold and vapours that
reduce the elasticity of the air” [Verminderung der ausspannenden Kraft durch
Kälte und Dämpfe, die die Federkraft der Luft schwächen].21 Back to the 1763 essay,
Kant concludes that
If the ground of the effects of a certain kind, which are similar, according to one law is not at
the same time, the ground of effects of a different kind in the same being, according to an-
other law, then the agreement of these laws with each other is contingent,22
17 “[…] nothwendiger Weise zugleich ein Grund von der Möglichkeit der Pumpwerke, von der
Möglichkeit der zu erzeugenden Wolken, der Unterhaltung des Feuers, der Winde etc. Es ist noth-
wendig, daß zu den übrigen der Grund anzutreffen sei, so bald auch nur zu einem einzigen der-
selben Grund da ist.” BDG, AA 02: 106. Emphasis added.
18 GSK, AA 01: 55.9.
19 For details, please see Massimi, Michela and De Bianchi, Silvia: “Cartesian echoes in Kant’s
philosophy of nature”. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44, 2013, 481–492.
20 NTH, AA 01: 325.19.
21 TW, AA 01: 491.
22 “Dagegen wenn der Grund einer gewissen Art ähnlicher Wirkungen nach einem Gesetze
nicht zugleich der Grund einer andern Art Wirkungen nach einem andern Gesetze in demselben
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and contingent the unity of these laws. In other words, if the ground of one set of
effects as given by a law (say the law that explains how the decrease in the elas-
ticity causes alteration in the equilibrium of the atmosphere, which results in
winds being produced) were not also the ground for a different kind of effects in
the same entity, according to another law (say, the law of combustion, which ex-
plains how fire can be maintained by elastic air), then the unity of these two laws
would be merely contingent, and contingent would be the order of nature estab-
lished by these laws.
The same line of reasoning applies to gravity, which in Universal Natural His-
tory Kant had already identified as one of the two key forces responsible for the
constitution of the universe. In The Only Possible Argument Kant identifies gravity
as “a cause which is, of necessity, sufficient to produce all these effects” (e.g. give
the earth its spherical form, keeps the moon in its orbit, etc.). Kant’s conclusion is
unequivocal:
Now, the fact that grounds are to be found in nature for all these effects is, without doubt,
a perfection. And if the same ground which determines the one thing should also be suf-
ficient to determine the others, then the unity which accrues to the whole is so much the
greater. But this unity and, along with it, the perfection as well, are, in the present case,
necessary, and they attach to the essence of the thing. And all the harmoniousness, fruitful-
ness, and beauty, which are in so far due to that unity, depend upon God either through the
mediation of the essential order of nature, or through the mediation of that which is neces-
sary in the order of nature.23
How can nature constitute a lawful unity, despite the contingency of natural
events? The Newtonian governing conception of laws left Kant with the three
philosophical problems we saw above, but it also provided the key to answering
them via the specific examples of elasticity and gravity as two fundamental forces
of nature.
Wesen ist, so ist die Vereinbarung dieser Gesetze zufällig, oder es herrscht in diesen Gesetzen
zufällige Einheit, und was sich darnach in dem Dinge zuträgt, geschieht nach einer zufälligen
Naturordnung.” BDG, AA 02: 106.
23 “Nun ist es ohne Zweifel eine Vollkommenheit, daß zu allen diesen Wirkungen Gründe in der
Natur angetroffen werden, und wenn der nämliche Grund, der die eine bestimmt, auch zu den
andern hinreichend ist, um desto mehr Einheit wächst dadurch dem Ganzen zu. Diese Einheit
aber und mit ihr die Vollkommenheit ist in dem hier angeführten Falle nothwendig und klebt
dem Wesen der Sache an, und alle Wohlgereimtheit, Fruchtbarkeit und Schönheit, die ihr in so
fern zu verdanken ist, hängt von Gott vermittelst der wesentlichen Ordnung der Natur ab, oder
vermittelst desjenigen, was in der Ordnung der Natur nothwendig ist.” BDG, AA 02: 107. Empha-
sis added.
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Recall the problem of nomological necessity: i.e., the necessity of the laws,
downstream of God as the supreme Lawgiver, did not seem to have a lien on nature,
without the back-up and intervention of God himself. But Kant could not accept
this Newtonian picture for two main reasons, I suggest. First, it delegates the no-
mological necessity of, say, the law of gravity to God’s free choice, without really
being able to explain why Fs are Gs, why the Moon, Jupiter, or any planet perse-
vere in their orbits; or why the Earth is spherical; and so on. Is it gravity that
necessitates these effects? How should we think of gravity as a force of nature, for
it to govern these effects? The Newtonian view makes nomological necessity para-
sitic upon God’s legislative choice and interventions in nature. As such, not only
does it deprive gravity (in and of itelsef) of its prescriptive, nomological force.
It also makes the effects due to gravity somehow inexplicable in the light of the
law of gravity itself.
Here we come to the second aforementioned problem arising from Newton’s
view, the problem of explicability. We are reminded here of Leibniz’s warning of
not to confuse the operations of God, with the “operations of things that follow
the law that God has given them, and which he has enabled them to follow by their
natural powers, though not without his assistance”.24 To avoid Leibniz’s charge
that the operations of the force of gravity were miraculous and obscure, the young
Kant felt the need of clarifying this crucial point. God might have given laws to na-
ture. But for those laws to have prescriptive force as well as for them to be able to
explain their effects, laws must track the way in which natural powers act. God
has bestowed natural powers on things in nature, and has also fixed the laws by
which natural powers should abide. The young Kant seems to be responding
to Leibniz (on behalf of Newton) that the operations of natural powers do not
require God’s intervention, although it is God, who has ultimately implanted
these natural powers – qua real grounds – in nature, and has also given them laws
to follow. In this way, Kant gave his own solution to both the problem of nomo-
logical necessity and the problem of explicability. His solution consists in popu-
lating nature with real grounds for the determination of a plurality of effects via
natural laws. The nomological necessity of the laws tracks then the way in which
if ground x is posited, necessarily effect y follows.
Kant’s solution to the problems left open by the Newtonian picture was to
shift the burden of nomological necessity from God’s legislative choice to nature
itself, by empowering nature with grounds (intended as real grounds) for the
determinations of various effects. Once more, Newton’s natural philosophy pro-
vided Kant with the examples he needed. The necessity with which objects con-
24 See footnote 10 above. Emphasis added.
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form to the law of gravity is no longer downstream of God’s legislative choice, but
resides instead in the ground-effect modal relation, whereby the same ground
may be causally responsible for a plurality of effects (e.g. making the Earth
spherical, lumping fine matter into planets and stars, keeping planets and comets
in their orbits, and so on). Similarly, the elasticity of the air acts as a ground for a
variety of effects in nature, from the generation of clouds, to the maintenance
of fire, and human respiration. These two fundamental forces of nature act as
grounds sufficient to determine a variety of effects. They act as real grounds,
which attach to the essence of things and determine their effects (e.g. being elastic
is for Kant a ground that belongs to the essence of air – qua “elastic air” – and
brings along with it many different effects).
Kant’s threefold solution to the problems left open by Newton’s governing
conception of laws can then be summarized as follows.
(1.a) Nomological necessity. Laws govern nature by necessitating the way in
which natural powers act. God might well have given laws to nature as His domin-
ion. But laws of nature have prescriptive force by fixing the bounds within which
nature’s powers unfold and manifest themselves. Thus, for example, the law of
gravity, while coming from God, it has a prescriptive force in and of itself, by fixing
the bounds within which gravity as a natural power – or, as Kant calls it, as a
ground – acts: namely, by being inversely proportional to the square of the dis-
tance, but directly proportional to the masses of the bodies. In sum, laws gov-
ern by necessitating the universal and immutable relations, under which natural
powers or real grounds operate (e.g. r2).
(2.a) Explicability. The notion of ground involves modality, and can be character-
ized in terms of necessity. For example, the maintenance of fire is grounded in
the repulsive force as a real ground, as much as the spherical form of the Earth
is grounded in the attractive force as another real ground. Being grounded here
means the following:
I. if the attractive force obtains, then, necessarily, the spherical form of the
Earth obtains too.
II. if the repulsive force obtains, then, necessarily, the maintenance of the fire
obtains too.
How to understand the modal nature of grounding here may vary, but I want to
suggest that the young Kant was suggesting a causal reading: the maintenance of
fire is grounded in the repulsive force in the sense that it obtains because of the
repulsive force. Similarly, the spherical form of the Earth is grounded in the at-
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tractive force in the sense that it obtains because of it. No wonder Kant calls
grounds “causes”, and phenomena such as fire, winds, clouds “effects”. Under-
standing the ground-effect modal relation in causal terms allowed Kant to explain
the operations of Newton’s two central forces, attraction and repulsion. Pace
Leibniz, the operation of natural powers, such as attraction and repulsion, are
neither miraculous nor obscure. By making attraction and repulsion grounds, and
by interpreting the ground-effect modal relation in causal terms, Kant was res-
cuing Newton from Leibniz’s objection of having introduced occult, inexplicable
qualities in natural philosophy.
At this point, the careful reader may worry that Kant’s solution to the problem
of explicability has only the effect of landing Kant into the treacherous terrain of
Godless Epicureanism, which Newton was himself at pain to avoid by denying
that gravity was an essential property of matter. And yet, the worry can soon be
deflated by noting how not only did Kant expressly distance himself from the
“blind necessity” of Epicureanism.25 He also regarded the essential order of na-
ture – constituted by forces of nature qua grounds, and by the natural law of
causality at work in the modal relation between grounds and effects – as sub-
sumed under God as the ultimate ground.26 No charge of lingering atheism could
be legitimately leveled against Kant’s solution.
25 See BDG, AA 02: 123.
26 BDG, AA 02: 99. “And the necessity of these laws is such that they can be derived from the uni-
versal and essential constitution of all matter without the least experiment and with the great-
ness distinctness. This acute and learned man [Maupertuis] immediately senses that in having
thus introduced unity [via the principle of least action, MM] into the infinite manifold of the uni-
verse and created order in what was blindly necessary, there must be some single supreme prin-
ciple to which the totality of things owed its harmony and appropriateness. He rightly believed
that such a universal cohesiveness […] afforded a far more fitting foundation for the indubitable
discovery, in some perfect and original being, of the ultimate cause of everything in the world”.
[Gleichwohl sind die Gesetze der Bewegung selber so bewandt, daß sich nimmermehr eine Ma-
terie ohne sie denken läßt, und sie sind so nothwendig, daß sie auch ohne die mindeste Versuche
aus der allgemeinen und wesentlichen Beschaffenheit aller Materie mit größter Deutlichkeit
können hergeleitet werden. Der gedachte scharfsinnige Gelehrte empfand alsbald, daß, indem
dadurch in dem unendlichen Mannigfaltigen des Universum Einheit und in dem blindlings Noth-
wendigen Ordnung verursacht wird, irgend ein oberstes Principium sein müsse, wovon alles
dieses seine Harmonie und Anständigkeit her haben kann. Er glaubte mit Recht, daß ein so all-
gemeiner Zusammenhang in den einfachsten Naturen der Dinge einen weit tauglichern Grund an
die Hand gebe, irgend in einem vollkommenen Urwesen die letzte Ursache von allem in der Welt
mit Gewißheit anzutreffen, als alle Wahrnehmung verschiedener zufälligen und veränderlichen
Anordnung nach besondern Gesetzen.] In this sense, Kant can also defend what, a few lines
later, he calls the “contingency of the laws of motion in the real sense of the term” (“Zufälligkeit
der Bewegungsgesetze im Realverstande”; BDG, AA 02: 100): namely, “the laws of motion and
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/20/15 10:56 AM
506 Michela Massimi
(3.a) Unity. Newton’s mathematical treatment of gravity left wide open the issue
of what confers unity to the contingent aggregate of phenomena including free
fall, ocean’s tides, planetary motions and so on. A metaphysical, rather than
mathematical, treatment was needed to this effect. But Newton never offered one,
as Kant complained as early as 1847.27 By introducing a one-to-many ground-
effects modal relation between gravity and all the aforementioned phenomena
(or, between the repulsive force and the wide-ranging phenomena of the formation
of winds and clouds, respiration, and fire), Kant could defend the unity, and
hence the harmoniousness, fruitfulness, and beauty of the order of nature:
The forces of nature and the causal laws which govern them, contain the ground of an order
of nature. This order of nature, in so far as it embraces a complex harmony in a necessary
unity, has the effect of turning the combination of much perfection in one ground into a law.
Thus, different natural effects are, in respect of their beauty and usefulness, to be regarded
as subsumed under the essential order of nature, and, by that means, as subsumed under
God.28
Against Newton’s top-down governing conception of laws, the young Kant ad-
vanced a bottom-up governing conception of laws, whereby the essential order of
nature with its fundamental forces as grounds comes first, and laws of nature gov-
ern by tracking the modal, one-to-many, relation between grounds and their ef-
fects. The prescriptive force of the laws originates then from the necessary unity of
the order of nature so understood, as an order of natural events where forces act
as grounds for the modal determination of their effects under the “natural law of
causality”. While subsumed under God, and depending ultimately on God (qua
the universal properties of matter, subject to these laws, must depend on some one great com-
mon original being, which is the ground of order and harmoniousness” [die Bewegungsgesetze
und die allgemeine Eigenschaften der Materie, die ihnen gehorchen, [müssen] irgend von einem
großen gemeinschaftlichen Urwesen, dem Grunde der Ordnung und Wohlgereimtheit, ab-
hängen]. It is perfectly compatible with Kant’s governing conception of laws to assume that
while laws are necessary in capturing ground-effects modal relations in nature, they are also ul-
timately contingent in depending on God, as Himself the ultimate ground of the order of nature.
The Newtonian intuition is rescued (laws are expression of a diving Lawgiver), but their prescrip-
tive force and explanatory power has now been fully explicated and defended.
27 See GSK, AA 01: 62.12–15.
28 “Weil nun die Kräfte der Natur und ihre Wirkungsgesetze den Grund einer Ordnung der Natur
enthalten, welche, in so fern sie mannigfaltige Harmonie in einer nothwendigen Einheit zusam-
menfaßt, veranlaßt, daß die Verknüpfung vieler Vollkommenheit in einem Grunde zum Gesetze
wird, so hat man verschiedene Naturwirkungen in Ansehung ihrer Schönheit und Nützlichkeit
unter der wesentlichen Naturordnung und vermittelst derselben unter Gott zu betrachten.” BDG,
AA 02: 107f.
Brought to you by | University of Edinburgh
Authenticated
Download Date | 1/20/15 10:56 AM
Prescribing laws to nature. Part I 507
ultimate ground) for its contingent existence, the order of nature enjoys also a cer-
tain degree of metaphysical autonomy from God in its operations. Kant’s God is no
longer Newton’s Lord God Pantokrator, governing His dominion with His immedi-
ate hand. In its place, Kant put the essential order of nature, as mediating between
the array of contingent natural events and God himself as the ultimate ground.
Concluding remarks
In this essay, I have taken some steps towards reconstructing the evolution of
Kant’s view on the lawfulness of nature in the pre-Critical period. I have shown
what is philosophically at stake in a governing conception of laws (namely,
nomological necessity and explanatory power). I have taken Newton as an illumi-
nating example of the governing conception of laws in the early modern period,
and I have illustrated some of the problems affecting Newton’s view. Finally,
I have argued that the young Kant around 1763 came to elaborate his own govern-
ing conception of laws, drawing on Newton’s natural philosophy for making his
case, while also providing his own solutions to the problems left open by Newton.
The final result is a governing conception of laws that retrieves the explanatory
power, nomological necessity, and the unity of the laws via the key metaphysical
notion of ground and the modal relation between grounds and effects.
Kant could retrieve the explanatory power of the laws (e.g. why fine matter
lumps; why planets stay in their orbits; why fire burns in the bowels of the Sun;
and so on) by making attraction and repulsion grounds that belong to the essence
of matter and air, respectively; and, by interpreting in causal terms the modal
relation between grounds and their effects (i.e. repulsion or elastic force obtains
in the air; and, necessarily, if repulsion obtains, fire is generated and maintained
in the bowels of the Sun where elastic air is trapped). Laws are explanatory be-
cause they track necessary ground-effects connections in nature, and in so doing
they also bring nature – as a sum of contingent natural events – into a unity,
which is perfect and necessary.
Kant could also retrieve the nomological necessity of the laws, not as down-
stream of God’s legislative choice, but as “the necessary unity in the relation be-
tween a simple ground and a multiplicity of appropriate consequences” [einer
nothwendigen Einheit in der Beziehung eines einfachen Grundes auf viele anstän-
dige Folgen].29 Laws of nature govern by positing simple grounds, whose “essen-
29 BDG, AA 02: 107.
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tial fruitfulness” brings along with it or necessitates a plurality of effects. Thus,
the young Kant could defend a bona fide governing conception of laws, by build-
ing nomological necessity bottom-up, from nature’s grounds and their necessary
effects. This is a hefty metaphysical price to pay, as Kant came to realize event-
ually. No wonder, in the Critical period, Kant came to distinguish between the
“lawfulness of things in themselves” [Gesetzmäßigkeit [von] Dingen an sich selbst]
and the “necessary lawfulness” [nothwendige […] Gesetzmäßigkeit] of the appear-
ances (qua natura formaliter spectata),30 which the faculty of the understanding
prescribes. By making causal laws prescriptions of the faculty of the understand-
ing on appearances, Kant arrived at a mature governing conception of laws. The
kind of necessity afforded by Kant’s mature view is, in the end, a purely transcen-
dental one, not a metaphysical one as any governing conception of laws would
require. But this is a story for another paper.
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